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THAWING THE FREEZE: CUTTING COSTS AND
INCREASING EFFICIENCY BY GRANTING
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE PRIORITY TO
NONQUANTIFIABLE BENEFITS
ABSTRACT

Disputes over priority claims in bankruptcy proceedings are common
because they are often the only way to recover assets from the limited pool
available to claimants. Claims for professional fees for those who facilitate
bankruptcy proceedings after the petition has been filed are given high priority
to ensure that they have incentive to complete their work. However, those who
come into bankruptcy with claims against the debtor have a much harder time
recovering their costs if they do any work to assist with the proceedings.
Currently, the administrative expense analysis requires these applicants to
demonstrate that they made a substantial contribution to the estate before
receiving priority on their claims for reimbursement. Courts overwhelmingly
deny requests for administrative expenses under § 503 of the Bankruptcy Code
because the applicant did not make a quantifiable benefit to the estate.
This Comment calls upon the Federal Judiciary and Congress to allow
administrative expense priority for reasonable expenses to applicants who
benefit the estate without being duplicative, self-interested, or meritless, but are
unable to directly quantify how they did so. For applicants and their attorneys,
this Comment serves as a guide on requesting administrative expense priority
for costs incurred when a direct benefit cannot be shown.
The current substantial contribution analysis will be discussed to show why
it should not require a benefit to be quantifiable. First, the types of potential
applicants for this priority claim will be analyzed to demonstrate how each can
benefit the estate in ways that are not quantifiable under the current
interpretation of § 503(b)(3)(D). The language that courts commonly use to
convey the rationale of a substantial contribution analysis will be discussed to
show that precedent does not preclude the proposed interpretation. An
interpretation is provided for the existing text of § 503(b)(3)(D) that would allow
courts to make this change on a case by case basis. Finally, a change to the text
of § 503(b)(3)(D) that would allow Congress to implement this change directly
is provided as a model.
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INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy estates, by definition, do not have enough assets to cover all
debts and expenses.1 As a result, costs are prioritized by § 507 of the Bankruptcy
Code (Code) to ensure that the assets of the estate are distributed in order of
importance.2 First priority is given to the repayment of professionals that
facilitate proceedings because their work is essential for the debtor to make it
through bankruptcy quickly and efficiently.3 These highly prioritized
repayments are classified as “administrative expenses” and they ensure that
those who keep the estate running smoothly are not discouraged from
participating due to a fear of not receiving payment.4
Other administrative expenses, however, are given second priority by
§ 507.5 These include the costs incurred by a variety of interested parties:
creditors,6 indenture trustees,7 equity security holders,8 and committees
representing creditors or equity security holders.9 This group will be collectively
referred to as “applicants” below. Those who qualify as applicants under
§ 503(b)(3)(D) only receive repayment if they show that their expenses were

1
An estate with sufficient assets to cover all expenses would have no use for discharge and would have
no reason to enter the bankruptcy process.
2
11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2019).
3
In re Goody’s Family Clothing, Inc., 401 B.R. 656, 662 (D. Del. 2009).
4
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 186–87 (1977).
5
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (2019).
6
A creditor is defined as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before
the order for relief concerning the debtor” by 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (2019). Entities with claims against the
estate of a kind specified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 348(d), 502(f), 502(g), 502(h) or 502(i). Community claims are also
creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).
7
An “indenture trustee” is “the person or institution charged with the fiduciary duty of carrying out the
terms of an agreement under which bonds or debentures are issued[.]” Mark A. Cohen, Reimbursement of
Indenture Trustees for Substantial Contribution Under Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. 647 (1991) (citing [Bankruptcy Reform] Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1011330 (1988)). The term indenture is defined as “mortgage, deed of trust, or
indenture, under which there is outstanding a security, other than a voting-trust certificate, constituting a claim
against the debtor, a claim secured by a lien on any of the debtor’s property, or an equity security of the debtor.”
11 U.S.C. § 101(28) (2019). The term indenture trustee is defined as a “trustee under an indenture.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(29) (2019).
8
Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(16) (2019), the term “equity security” means “(A) share in a corporation,
whether or not transferable or denominated ‘stock’, or similar security; (B) interest of a limited partner in a
limited partnership; or (C) warrant or right, other than a right to convert, to purchase, sell, or subscribe to a share,
security, or interest of a kind specified in subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph.” The term “Equity Security
Holder” is defined as the “holder of an equity security of the debtor” by 11 U.S.C. § 101(17) (2019).
9
Committees representing creditors and equity security holders can apply for administrative expense
reimbursement under the same provision as the parties they are representing. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D).
However, this section does not allow for the repayment of administrative expenses for committees created under
11 U.S.C. § 1102, which use a different standard for reimbursement under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(F).
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“actual and necessary” and incurred while making a “substantial contribution”
to the estate.10
This approach, although reasonable on the surface, has caused an
unnecessary problem within bankruptcy litigation: the “substantial contribution”
analysis has been interpreted to only allow administrative expense priority for
claimants who can show that they made a benefit to a bankruptcy estate that is
“quantifiable,” meaning that the benefit must be measurable and have directly
contributed assets to the bankruptcy estate.11 However, significant benefits can
be conferred that are difficult or impossible to quantify under this standard.
The substantial contribution analysis in Matter of D’Lites provides a good
illustration of what is not considered a quantifiable benefit under the current
standard.12 In Matter of D’Lites, the applicant, Walton Investments, Inc., ran the
debtor’s business using Walton employees in an attempt to keep the company
afloat.13 Although this provided the estate with the benefit of a workforce that
operated the business as it wound down, the court held that it did not constitute
a substantial benefit to the estate in part because it could not be quantified.14
The court then compared the facts with those of a case heard by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.15 In Park Terrace Townhouses v. Wilds, the applicant
“instituted a marketing program which significantly increased occupancy rates
and monthly income” at the debtor’s property.16 While the applicants in both
cases made an effort to benefit the estate, only the applicant in Park Terrace was
awarded administrative expenses because he was able to quantify the benefit he
conferred.17 This Comment proposes that an applicant who is unable to directly
quantify a benefit to the estate should be granted administrative expense priority
for reasonable expenses spent on good faith efforts to increase the value of the
estate.
The proposed increase in the number of applicants who qualify for
administrative expenses must be reconciled with the purpose of limiting priority
in the first place. There are many reasons for having limits imposed on the range
10

11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3) (2019).
See In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. 352, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (“[Applicant] insists that the
continued operation of the business increased the value of D’Lites assets at the time of sale, but it does not
quantify the benefit to the estate.”).
12
Id.
13
Id. at 354 (citing Park Terrace Townhouses v. Wilds, 852 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir. 1988)).
14
In re D’Lites of Am. Inc., 108 B.R. at 356.
15
Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d 1019.
16
In re D’Lites of Am. Inc., 108 B.R. at 356 (citing Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d 1019).
17
Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d at 1023.
11
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of possible claims against the bankruptcy estate: § 503 is intended to balance
competing interests in this context––on the one hand, promoting meaningful
creditor participation––on the other hand, minimizing costs to the estate.18
Therefore, courts have an interest in preventing administrative costs from
“mushrooming,”19 and excluding claims that are “duplicative,”20 solely
motivated by self-interest,21 or create meritless legal actions.22
It is possible to recognize and endorse the restrictions above and still permit
non-quantifiable benefits to a bankruptcy estate to be honored and repaid. When
creditor participation can be encouraged while lowering costs to the estate, both
aims of § 503 can be met simultaneously. Creditors who benefit the estate in
ways that smooth the bankruptcy process, lower costs, foster collaboration, etc.
should have the opportunity to recover reasonable costs for their efforts.
The current requirement that a benefit be quantifiable before priority is
granted is problematic because it does not give applicants an incentive to assist
in the administrative process. Instead, applicants face a “chilling effect”23
because they are afraid to “throw good money after bad.”24 With a small and
manageable change in this area of the law, however, this problem can be
eliminated without significant additional burdens being imposed on the
bankruptcy process.
This Comment proposes a solution that requires only a small adjustment in
the language or interpretation of § 503(b)(3)(D) but will result in increased
judicial efficiency, shortened cases, and the more efficient use of resources.
Allowing applicants to show that they benefited the estate in new ways will keep
the competing interests of § 503 balanced25 because not only will more
18

H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 186–87 (1977).
See In re Alert Holdings Inc., 157 B.R. 753, 757 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing In re S & Y
Enterprises, LLC, 480 B.R. 452, 459 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012)); In re Am. Plumbing & Mech., Inc., 327 B.R.
273, 279 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005) (citing In re Alert Holdings Inc., 157 B.R. at 757) (suggesting that if the court
is not careful, administrative expense claims could eat up more and more assets of an estate until there is nothing
left for creditors).
20
See In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. 352.
21
See id.
22
See In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1986).
23
“In addition to their own expenses, creditors may owe compensation and expenses to attorneys and
accountants they have hired to facilitate workable solutions to reorganization. The prospect of paying expenses
without reimbursement is daunting when one considers that most creditors ultimately will collect mere pennies
on the dollar.” Edward A. Stone, Encouraging Creditor Participation: Integrating the Allowance of
Administrative Expenses with the Common Fund Theory, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 223, 223 (1998).
24
Stephen A. Stripp, An Analysis of the Role of the Bankruptcy Judge and the Use of Judicial Time, 23
SETON HALL L. REV. 1329, 1393 (1993) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 92 (1977)).
25
See Leidos Eng’g, LLC v. Kior, Inc. (In re Kior, Inc), 567 B.R. 451, 459 (D. Del. 2017).
19
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applicants have an incentive to participate in proceedings, but costs of
administering the estate will decrease as well.
This Comment calls upon the Federal Judiciary and Congress to allow
administrative expense priority for reasonable expenses to applicants who
benefit the estate without being duplicative, self-interested, or meritless but are
unable to directly quantify how they did so. For applicants and their attorneys,
the following serves as a guide on requesting administrative expense priority for
costs incurred when a direct benefit cannot be shown.
The current substantial contribution analysis will be discussed to show why
it should not require a benefit to be quantifiable. First, the types of potential
applicants for this priority claim will be analyzed to demonstrate how each can
benefit the estate in ways that are not quantifiable under the current
interpretation of § 503(b)(3)(D). The language that courts commonly use to
convey the rationale of a substantial contribution analysis will be discussed to
show that precedent does not preclude the proposed interpretation. An
interpretation is provided for the existing text of § 503(b)(3)(D) that would allow
courts to make this change on a case-by-case basis. Finally, a change to the text
of § 503(b)(3)(D) that would allow Congress to implement this change directly
is provided as a model.
A. Participation is Worth Promoting
This Comment does not suggest that courts should allow administrative
expenses to all applicants, as this would almost certainly lead to estates being
bombarded with frivolous claims. Instead, it proposes that judges read
§ 503(b)(3)(D) to allow for reasonable compensation for applicants who benefit
the estate in a manner that cannot be quantified to an exact figure. The small
amount of time spent working out how much an applicant has benefited the
estate will be offset by the benefits of having more efficient parties take on
administrative tasks. Creating new avenues for applicants to receive
administrative expense priority will also incentivize behavior that adds value to
the estate indirectly.
Providing applicants an incentive to benefit the estate will result in faster
cases, larger recoveries, and more debtors exiting bankruptcy without being
liquidated.26 When applicants are in a better position to facilitate bankruptcy
26
Karen Gross & Patricia Redmond, In Defense of Debtor Exclusivity: Assessing Four of the 1994
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 308 (1995) (discussing the promotion of creditor
participation specifically but the concept applies to all types of applicants).
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proceedings, they should not be encouraged to do so in exchange for nothing.
Applicants should be given an incentive to participate, especially when doing so
will reduce costs and increase efficiency. Preventing an applicant from receiving
fair pay for work done reduces the efficiency of the bankruptcy system and
overall participation.
While applicants are eligible for administrative expenses under the current
interpretation of the law, it is rare that they will be reimbursed unless they
demonstrate a quantifiable benefit to the estate. By allowing for new ways of
showing how an applicant benefited the estate, the bankruptcy system will
ensure that tasks are being completed by the most willing and capable party.
B. Section 503(b)(3) is Drafted Ambiguously, Leaving Room for Courts to
Implement this Solution Without Overturning Precedent
The Code’s administrative expenses statute, 11 U.S.C. § 503, provides in
relevant part:
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative
expenses, other than claims allowed under section 502(f) of this title,
including . . . (3) the actual, necessary expenses, other than
compensation and reimbursement specified in paragraph (4) of this
subsection, incurred by . . . (D) a creditor, an indenture trustee, an
equity security holder, or a committee representing creditors or equity
security holders other than a committee appointed under section 1102
of this title, in making a substantial contribution in a case under
chapter 9 or 11 of this title.27

Subsection D outlines the types of applicants that are eligible to receive
administrative expenses under the § 503(b)(3)(D) analysis. Each potential
applicant has a different route to be granted a substantial contribution. Each
category of applicant is discussed below.
C. The Solution Proposed by this Comment Applies to any § 503(b)(3)(D)
Applicant
Administrative expenses may be granted for four types of applicants who
have made a “substantial contribution” to a bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(3)(D). Applicants may include: creditors,28 indenture trustees,29 equity

27
28
29

11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) (2019).
See supra note 6.
See supra note 7.
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security holders,30 and committees representing creditors or equity security
holders.31 Such administrative expenses receive increased priority to “encourage
applicants to participate in the liquidation or reorganization of the estate.”32
However, this goal is in direct tension with the “contrasting policy that
administrative expenses of the estate be kept to a minimum.”33 As a result,
Section 503(b)(3)(D) is narrowly construed to provide expenses only when the
applicant is found to have made a “substantial contribution” to the estate.34
Rather than suggesting that the substantial contribution requirement be
removed from Section 503(b)(3)(D), this Comment suggests expanding the
requirement slightly to include contributions that may not be able to be
quantified to an exact figure.
Currently, the substantial contribution analysis limits the benefits that courts
are willing to consider for administrative expenses to those that directly add
quantifiable funds to the bankruptcy estate. Adding resources is just one of the
many ways that an applicant can provide a benefit to the estate. The numerous
other ways for applicants to benefit the estate should be promoted through the
through the reward of administrative expenses.
Many of these benefits can be provided by any of the four applicant types.
Any applicant could resolve an ambiguity in a case such as determining the
proper value of a disputed item. Any applicant could allow the estate to continue
operating as usual.35 Any applicant could help draft and confirm a plan
submitted by the debtor36 or propose a plan that is confirmed when the debtor
has failed to do so.37 The temperature of a case could be “cooled off” by any
applicant who “prevent[s] excess[] litigation and encourages[es] cooperation.”38
Even urging for the appointment of a trustee can confer a benefit upon the
estate.39

30

See supra note 8.
See supra note 9.
32
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 186–87 (1977).
33
In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 103 B.R. 427, 429 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
34
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) (2019).
35
In re Am. Plumbing & Mech., Inc., 327 B.R. 273, 282 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005) (citing In re
TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp., 978 F.2d 1409, 1420 (5th Cir. 1992).
36
Id. (citing In re Richton Int’l Corp., 15 B.R. 854, 856 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)); In re Baldwin–United
Corp., 79 B.R. 321, 340–41 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987)).
37
In re Am. Plumbing & Mech., Inc., 327 B.R. at 282 (citing In re Jelinek, 153 B.R. 279, 281 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1993)).
38
Id. (citing Matter of Baldwin-United Corp., 79 B.R. 321, 343 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987)).
39
Id. (citing In re Paolino, 71 B.R. 576, 580 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)).
31
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1. Creditors
Creditors have many ways to participate in bankruptcy proceedings that
confer a benefit to the estate that are not quantifiable. There are several examples
of courts finding that a creditor’s nonquantifiable benefit constituted a
substantial contribution in a Comment previously published in this journal:
Encouraging Creditor Participation: Integrating the Allowance of
Administrative Expenses with the Common Fund Theory.40
Creditors are often in a good position to detect fraud and bring it to the
debtor’s attention. “The Fifth Circuit held that causing a debtor to change its
reorganization plan and recovering a fraudulent transfer that resulted in a $3
million increase in the value of the property of the estate was a substantial
contribution to reorganization.”41
Creditors are familiar with inside information that can be helpful to
determine logistical problems with litigation. “One creditors’ committee
attorney successfully prevented a debtor from retaining counsel with a conflict
of interest problem, potentially saving the estate unnecessary expenses, and the
court held this constituted a substantial contribution to the estate which entitled
the creditor to reimbursement.”42
Creditors can play an active role in the confirmation of a reorganization plan,
cutting costs and reducing wasted time in the process. “Another bankruptcy
court found a substantial contribution when an applicant’s efforts resulted in the
successful confirmation of a plan which provided for full payment to all creditors
over the Debtor’s proposed plan which provided for picayune or token
payments . . . .”43
This Comment proposes that the many nonquantifiable benefits conferred
by creditors should be considered a substantial contribution and granted
administrative expense priority.
Creditors are in a difficult situation from the outset of a bankruptcy case
because they are seeking recovery of debts owed to them by the debtor.44 To
make matters worse, creditors must use their own resources to participate in the

40

Stone, supra note 23.
Id. (citing In re DP Partners, Ltd., 106 F.3d 667, 673 (5th Cir. 1997)).
42
Id. (citing In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 176 B.R. 815, 820 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995)).
43
Id. (citing In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 B.R. 246, 252 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990)) (internal
quotation omitted).
44
See id. at 223.
41
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proceedings and can be reluctant to “throw good money after bad.”45 As a result,
“[d]enying administrative expense priority to creditors who have out of pocket
expenses creates a potentially chilling effect on creditor participation in the
reorganization process.”46 According to U.S. Trustee William Neary, promoting
creditor participation in bankruptcy “would be well worth the effort; cases could
move faster, creditor recoveries could be increased and a larger number of
debtors might be salvaged.”47
2. Indenture Trustees
An indenture trustee is like a stakeholder whose duties and obligations are
exclusively defined by the terms of an indenture agreement.48 An “indenture
agreement” is a contract made between a trustee and a bondholder that represents
the bondholders’ interests.49 This agreement also includes the rules and
responsibilities of the parties.50
An indenture is a type of interest that a party may have that is defined by a
contract made between a bond issuer and a trustee that represents the
bondholder’s interests. The indenture trustee represents those interests by
highlighting the rules and responsibilities of the parties.
An indenture is a mortgage, deed of trust, or similar, under which there is an
outstanding security constituting a claim against the debtor, a security interest in
the debtor’s property, or an equity security of the debtor.
Indenture trustees are individuals or institutions charged with the fiduciary
duty of carrying out the terms of the contract between the bond issuer and bond
holder.51 The term “debentures” may also be used, but “[n]o formal legal
distinction has developed concerning the terms ‘bonds’ and ‘debentures,’ but
‘bonds’ generally refers to secured long-term debt obligations, and ‘debentures’
to unsecured long-term debt obligations.”52

45

Stripp, supra note 24, at 1340 n.25 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 186–87 (1977)).
Stone, supra note 23, at 223.
47
Gross & Richmond, supra note 26, at 308.
48
Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, 26 N.E.2d 801 (N.Y. 1940).
49
See Stewart M. Robertson, Debenture Holders and the Indenture Trustee: Controlling Managerial
Discretion in the Solvent Enterprise, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 461 (1988).
50
See id.
51
Cohen, supra note 7 (citing [Bankruptcy Reform] Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549).
52
Robertson, supra note 49, at 461 n.2.
46
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Indenture trustees become a part of the reorganization process when the
debtor defaults on its obligations according to the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.53
The Trust Indenture Act was created after the financial collapse of 1929 “to
account for what in many cases appeared to be its flagrant disrespect for the
rights of security holders prior to and during the administration of default
proceedings.”54
Indenture trustees should be encouraged to meaningfully participate in the
bankruptcy process because they often play a significant role in the confirmation
or opposition of the reorganization plan.55 Congress has specifically outlined
that assisting the confirmation of a reorganization plan is sufficient grounds for
a finding of a substantial contribution.56 Furthermore, “Congress acknowledged
that indenture trustees benefit the reorganization of an estate by their very
participation under fiduciary standards.”57
Indenture trustees often play “a significant role in the initiation of the
proceeding,58 as well as in the formulation of, opposition to or confirmation of
the debtor’s plan of reorganization.”59 As the confirmation or denial of the
reorganization plan can make the difference between a debtor surviving a
bankruptcy or being liquidated through chapter 7, indenture trustees are often in
a position to make a substantial contribution to the estate. However, these
contributions are currently being precluded from administrative expense priority
because they are nonquantifiable.60
3. Equity Security Holders
Equity security holders hold some equity interest of the debtor in a
bankruptcy case. Equity security or equity interest can include shares of a
corporation or an interest of a limited partner in a limited partnership. It can also
include the right to buy, sell, or subscribe to a share in a corporation or
partnership. These individuals or entities may vote on a plan of reorganization

53

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa–77rrr (1988).
Robertson, supra note 49, at 461 n.2.
55
Cohen, supra note 7 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1988)).
56
See S. REP. NO. 95-598, at 66–67 (1978).
57
In re Multiponics, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (E.D. La. 1977) (discussing expenses being granted
under Section 242 of the Code).
58
Cohen, supra note 7, at 647 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1988)).
59
Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 186–87 (1977)).
60
A useful guide on how substantial contribution claims by indenture trustees should be treated is
outlined by Cohen supra note 7, at 674.
54
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and may file a proof of interest. Like other applicants, they hope to recover their
interest in the bankruptcy estate.
Equity security holders can substantially contribute to the estate without it
being quantifiable in much the same way that creditors can. The ability to take
part in the reorganization vote alone makes them candidates for administrative
expense priority because they can facilitate that process and substantially benefit
the estate.61
4. Committees Representing Creditors or Equity Security Holders
Groups of creditors and equity security holders can be represented by
committees. These committees can benefit the estate in the same manner as the
parties they represent. Official committees are regulated by the Code and often
directly participate in chapter 11 reorganization plans. Courts are split on the
issue of allowing official committees to be reimbursed for their costs and
expenses incurred in making a substantial contribution.62 Unofficial or ad hoc
committees are not regulated and act just as a group of creditors or equity
security holders would.
Courts have held that official committees appointed under chapter 11 are
entitled to administrative expenses because of implied authority. Other courts
“presume” that expenses from official committees are reimbursable.63 However,
official committees have been totally precluded from receiving administrative
expenses from still other courts.64 Those courts preclude official committees
from recovering under § 503(b)(3)(D) because they are already granted
attorney’s fees and expenses statutorily.65
Although this discussion is outside the scope of this Comment, the principle
that any applicant who provides a substantial contribution to the estate should
be granted an administrative expense does include official committees.
Committees may substantially contribute to the estate just as their individual
members would, but often do so on a larger scale. In practice, a substantial
contribution was found when an attorney representing a creditors’ committee

61

See S. REP. NO. 95-598, at 66–67 (1978).
Compare In re Grynberg, 19 B.R. 621, 622–23 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982), with In re Major Dynamics,
Inc., 16 B.R. 279, 280 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).
63
In re Western Co. of North America, 123 B.R. 546 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
64
In re Auto. Nat’l Brands, Inc., 65 B.R. 412 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986).
65
Id. at 415.
62
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prevented a debtor from retaining counsel that would have created a conflict of
interest in the proceedings that could cost the estate unnecessary expenses.66
Each of the four types of applicant can substantially contribute to the estate
without having that contribution be quantifiable. When conducting the
substantial contribution analysis, the language used by courts does not require
the benefit be quantifiable, so applicants should not be denied recovery on that
ground.
D. All Applicants Should Have the Opportunity to Recover Reasonable
Expenses Incurred to Indirectly Benefit the Estate
Nonquantifiable benefits should not be automatically excluded from the
substantial contribution analysis solely because they cannot be quantified.
Maximizing the estate’s assets67 without directly adding funds still benefits the
bottom line. Expediting the case68 reduces all expenses and allows all creditors
to receive payment in less time. Implementing an incentive plan is often more
easily accomplished by an applicant than by a debtor,69 saving time and money
for the estate. An applicant cooperating with creditors can also provide major
benefits to the estate without directly increasing its assets.70 Negotiating the
resolution of the confirmation hearing is a major challenge for debtors and is
often only possible through the efforts of applicants.71
While it is currently unusual for applicants to confer a benefit upon the
estate, providing additional methods of securing administrative expense priority
would incentivize this in the future. Most applicants cannot risk investing time
and effort into increasing the value of an estate when they are overwhelmingly
denied recovery. This Comment proposes that applicants should not be
automatically excluded from administrative expense priority because no direct
benefit to the estate can be shown. Instead, courts should allow applicants to
demonstrate how their efforts conferred a benefit upon the estate indirectly and
grant administrative expense priority to those who can show such benefit.

66

Stone, supra note 23, at 227 (citing In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 176 B.R. 815, 820 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.

1995)).
67

Id. at 248.
Gross & Redmond, supra note 26, at 308 (trustee Neary argues that increasing creditor participation
will lead to, among other benefits, faster case administration).
69
Rebecca Revich, The KERP Revolution, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87 (2007).
70
Stone, supra note 23, at 233.
71
Steere v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 98 F.2d 889, 891 (3d Cir. 1938) (assisting with the confirmation
plan has been seen as a benefit to the estate for almost 100 years).
68
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This solution does leave open another ambiguity that must be addressed. To
compensate an applicant for conferring a benefit upon the estate that cannot be
quantified, the value of that compensation must be determined. This Comment
proposes that courts should grant administrative expense priority to applicants
for reasonable costs incurred while making a good faith effort to benefit the
estate. These indirect benefits should result in compensation even if they appear
to result in a net monetary loss for the estate. Costing the estate money in one
area while saving it more money in another can easily result in a significant
benefit for the estate.
When an applicant acts in good faith to benefit the estate, there is a
possibility that the applicant’s actions will decrease the assets in the estate. For
example, an applicant who resolves an ambiguity may discover that the value of
the assets in the estate was less than initially projected. While the estate’s value
has been directly reduced, the applicant has nonetheless indirectly benefited the
estate by resolving that issue before it could cause additional problems. The
court should not bear the cost of resolving ambiguities when the debtor wants
the true value to remain unknown. Instead, the estate should compensate the
applicant for reasonable costs incurred when resolving this ambiguity.
Allowing reasonable compensation for indirect benefits should be restricted
to when the applicant is acting in good faith. Applicants should not be rewarded
for intentionally trying to lower the value of the estate out of their own selfinterest. The good faith requirement here is imposed because applicants should
be rewarded for trying to increase the value of the estate for the benefit of
everyone involved in the bankruptcy proceedings. When that goal is being
furthered, courts should not automatically bar the applicant from recovering
some expenses through administrative priority solely because the benefit cannot
be quantified.
Although rare, significant benefits to the estate that cannot be quantified
should be encouraged. Applicants that confer benefits should not be excluded
from administrative expense consideration because they did not directly add
value to the estate. Instead, applicants should have the opportunity to seek
reasonable compensation for their good faith efforts by showing that they
indirectly benefited the estate.
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E. Neither the Text of 503(b)(3)(D) nor the Interpretations Provided by
Common Law Require a Benefit to Be Quantifiable to Be a Substantial
Contribution
Congress drafted 11 U.S.C. § 503 without the term “quantifiable.”72
However, courts have interpreted the phrase “substantial contribution” in
section 503(b)(3) inconsistently.73 While this issue has been litigated and a
wealth of opinions exist that shed light on a clear meaning, different
interpretations are used by jurisdictions around the United States. While the
requirement that a substantial contribution be quantifiable has been read into the
text of § 503 (b)(3)(D), each core phrase described below has room to allow
applicants to recover for indirect benefits as proposed by this Comment.
1. The Core Phrases Used by Courts in Substantial Contribution Analysis
Do Not Require that the Benefit to the Estate Be Quantifiable
The definition of a substantial contribution is inconsistent,74 “which
consequently requires the courts to construe it in each individual case as a matter
of judicial discretion, without the benefit of clear congressional guidance.”75
Several “core phrases” are recited frequently in opinions dealing with substantial
contributions. This language is used by courts to describe what a substantial
contribution applicant must show. Unfortunately, the phrases often overlap,
cause confusion, and prevent parties from participating in proceedings because
of uncertainty. These core phrases include terms such as “foster,”76 “enhance,”77
“demonstrable,”78 “indirect,”79 “incidental,”80 “minimal”81 and “benefit.”82
Despite their ubiquity, they offer little guidance to an applicant deciding whether
to participate in bankruptcy proceedings.83

72

See generally 11 U.S.C. § 503 (2019).
See Stone, supra note 23, at 227–28.
74
See generally In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. 770, 780–81 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014) (quoting In re
Energy Partners, Ltd., 422 B.R. 68, 80 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (citing In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 2006)).
75
Stone, supra note 23, at 226.
76
Pierson & Gaylen v. Creel & Atwood (In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc.), 785 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th
Cir. 1986).
77
Id.
78
In re Texaco, Inc., 90 B.R. 622, 630 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
79
In re Baldwin-United Corp., 79 B.R. 321, 341 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987).
80
See In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 B.R. 246, 251 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
81
See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 79 B.R. 321, 341 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987).
82
See id.
83
Cohen, supra note 7, at 677 n.152.
73
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Although this confusing language is the most commonly used standard for
the substantial contribution analysis, some courts are already looking to expand
the definition. One court stated that “[i]t would be inequitable and unfair to deny
[the applicant] any compensation from the debtor’s estate” even though the Code
provided no direct avenue for recovery.84 The court also suggested that the
language most often used by that jurisdiction, “Foster-and-Enhance-Ratherthan-Retard-or-Interrupt-the-Reorganization-Process,” was just one possible
basis for compensation under § 503.85
No matter the jurisdiction, room exists to allow for benefits to the estate that
are not quantifiable to be given administrative expense priority. A selection of
core phrases that are used commonly across the country is provided below.
a. “Direct Benefit”
The direct benefit rule is grounded in congressional language86 and is the
oldest and most ambiguous of the core phrases. It is a requirement that has been
read into the text of § 503 that benefits to the estate must be direct to be
considered a substantial contribution for administrative expense purposes. While
it provides little guidance on its face, this rule has been developed into more
specific language over the years. For example, one court considered (among
other factors) “whether the applicant provided a ‘direct, significant, and
demonstrably positive benefit’ to the estate. . . .”87
The phrase “substantial contribution” is “derived from §§ 242 and 243 of the
former Bankruptcy Act.”88 When utilizing or analyzing the direct benefit
requirement, courts often cite the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 that provides, “[the direct benefit rule] does not require a
contribution that leads to confirmation of a plan, for in many cases, it will be a
substantial contribution if the person involved uncovers facts that would lead to
a denial of confirmation, such as fraud in connection with the case.”89 This
84
Id. at 677 n.153 (citing In re Glade Springs, Inc., 77 B.R. 184, 196 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987), vacated,
826 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1987)).
85
In re Glade Springs, Inc., 77 B.R. at 194, vacated, 826 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1987).
86
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 355 (1977).
87
Stone, supra note 23, at 227 (quoting In re Buckhead Am. Corp., 161 B.R. 11, 15 (Bankr. D. Del.
1993); In re Alert Holdings, Inc., 157 B.R. 753, 757 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing In re FRG, Inc., 124 B.R.
653, 658 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991)); In re Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 112 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989)).
88
In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 B.R. 557, 566 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95595, at 355 (1977); In re Grynberg, 19 B.R. 621, 623 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982) (“[Section] 503(b)(3)(D) is the
progeny of § 243 . . . .”).
89
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 186–87 (1977) (cited by In re Grasso, 519 B.R. 137, 142 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2014); Lebron v. Mechem Fin. Inc., 27 F.3d 937, 945 (3d Cir. 1994)).
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language is the oldest “test” used to understand the substantial contribution
analysis and has been developed over the years into more precise rules and
requirements.
b. “Significance”
Generally, the “Significance Test” is when a court “focuses upon the degree
or significance of the contribution being considered.”90 Under this test,
applicants are required to show that they contributed “[s]omething more than
minimal assistance to the estate. . . .”91 Courts using this language require that
the entities seeking reimbursement “prove that the expenses resulted in a
significant and tangible benefit to the estate[.]”92
Some courts use the Significance Test as a “threshold measure to assess
whether further inquiry is required.”93 Jurisdictions using this approach require
an applicant’s services to “reach a significant level” before proceeding further
with the substantial contribution analysis.94
Other courts consider the significance of a benefit alongside the rest of the
substantial contribution analysis.95 This interpretation “parallels” the benefit to
the estate test,96 placing a focus on the benefit to the estate being “tangible.”97
The requirement that a benefit be “significant” is prevalent in the few
opinions that delve into the relationship among the Code, the Trust Indenture
Act and their legislative histories.98 These opinions hold that this relationship
requires the applicant to show an “actual direct and demonstrable benefit” to the
estate.99 This is a common core phrase used by many other opinions as well.100
90

In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 B.R. 246, 253 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
Cohen, supra note 7, at 677 (citing In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 Bankr. 246, 253
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); see also In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 Bankr. 352, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989)
(applicant must prove both significant and tangible benefits).
92
In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. at 356.
93
Cohen, supra note 7, at 677.
94
Id. (citing In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 B.R. at 253); see also In re D’Lites of Am.,
Inc., 108 B.R. at 356 (applicant must prove both significant and tangible benefits).
95
In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 B.R. at 253; see also In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R.
at 356 (the applicant was required to prove that the benefit was both significant and tangible).
96
Cohen, supra note 7, at 666.
97
In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. at 356.
98
See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Tr. Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 422; In re Pacific Homes, 20
B.R. 729, 749–50 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982); In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 366 F.Supp. 1376, 1387–88 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
99
Mark A. Cohen, Reimbursement of Indenture Trustees for Substantial Contribution Under Section 503
of the Bankruptcy Code, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 647, 667 (1991).
100
See, e.g., In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. 770, 780–81 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014); In re Energy
91
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The strict language of the Significance Test requires the benefit to be
conferred on “the debtor’s estate, the creditors, and to the extent relevant, the
stockholders.”101 Similar language was used by one district court in the First
Circuit that required “a measurable and valuable benefit to the Debtor’s
estate.”102
Some courts require that those looking for reimbursement of administrative
assets “demonstrate that their services were exceptional.”103 However, it does
not follow that services that cannot be quantified can never provide an actual
and demonstrable benefit or be exceptional enough to receive an allowance.
i. Case Analysis
Further analysis of this test is required because there is a specific split in
authority that is worth highlighting. The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Georgia distinguished facts that satisfied the significance test from
those that would not in In re D’Lites of America, Inc.104 In In re D’Lites, the
applicant, Walton Investments, Inc., began running the debtor’s business using
Walton employees in an attempt to keep it operational and ultimately worth
more.105 The court compared the facts there with those of a case heard by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Park Terrace.106 In Park Terrace, the
applicant “instituted a marketing program which significantly increased
occupancy rates and monthly income” at the debtor’s property.107
From the facts presented so far, both applicants took actions intending to
make the estate more valuable. Before looking at how the court reached its
conclusion in In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., it is important to establish that Walton
Investments made two loans of $250,000 and replaced D’Lites employees for
the purpose of purchasing the company.108 There is a split of authority on the
issue of considering a creditor’s motives when conducting a substantial
Partners, Ltd., 422 B.R. 68, 80 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009); In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113, 132–35 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2006).
101
In re Granite Partners, 213 B.R. 440, 445 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); Stone, supra note 23, at 252 (citing
Haskins v. United States (In re Lister), 846 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1988).
102
In re Boston and Me. Corp., 62 B.R. 199, 203 (D. Mass. 1986).
103
Matter of W.T. Grant Co., 85 B.R. 250, 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. In re W.T. Grant Co., 119 B.R. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d sub nom. In re W.T. Grant Co. 935 F.2d 1277
(2d Cir. 1991).
104
In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. 352, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989).
105
Id. at 354 (citing Park Terrace Townhouses v. Wilds, 852 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir. 1988)).
106
Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d 1019.
107
In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. at 356 (citing Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d 1019).
108
Id. at 354.
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contribution analysis.109 The vast majority of jurisdictions “deny reimbursement
where the applicant’s actions are self-interested and duplicative.”110 An
applicant acting in their own interest is sufficient evidence to deny the claim
here because this court adheres to the ruling that an applicant is not entitled to
administrative expense priority when acting in its own interest rather than the
interest of the estate.111
Two key distinctions were made by the court in In re D’Lites of Am., Inc.,
with the first providing a good illustration of the current understanding of a
“significant” benefit to the estate. This opinion will be used to illustrate how the
interpretation of the substantial contribution proposed by this Comment is
consistent with current precedent. Also, remember, this analysis was used by the
court to demonstrate that Walton Investments, Inc. was acting out of personal
interest, not that these issues would preclude administrative expense priority
otherwise.
The applicant in Park Terrace was awarded administrative expenses because
he “provided a significant and tangible benefit to the estate by maintaining,
upgrading and remodeling the debtor’s rental units, and by increasing occupancy
rates and monthly income[.]”112 The applicant in In re D’Lites of Am., Inc.,
however, “sustained approximately $700,000.00 in losses during its operating
effort [to keep the business afloat.]”113 The applicant “insist[ed] that the
continued operation of the business increased the value of [the debtor’s] assets
at the time of sale,” but the court was unwilling to award administrative expenses
because the applicant did not “quantify the benefit to the estate.”114
This comparison provides an opportunity to illustrate how this Comment
proposes to change the interpretation of the substantial contribution analysis.
The applicant in Park Terrace made a substantial contribution to the estate under
the current understanding because he increased occupancy rates and monthly
income.115 The applicant in In re D’Lites did not make a substantial contribution
under the current understanding because the business lost money due to its
109
In re 1250 Oceanside Partners, 519 B.R. 802, 807 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2014) (citing In re Cellular 101,
Inc., 377 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2004)).
110
Cohen, supra note 7, at 647, 672–73 n.163.
111
In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. at 357 (citing In re Lister, 846 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1988); In re
Patch Graphics, 58 B.R. 743, 746 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986); In re McK, Ltd., 14 B.R. 518, 520 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1981)) (“When a creditor incurs expenses primarily to protect its own interests rather than the interests of the
estate, the creditor is not entitled to a priority claim.”).
112
In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. at 356 (citing Park Terrace Townhouses 852 F.2d 1019.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
See Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d 1019.
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efforts. However, both applicants provided benefits to the estate that cannot be
quantified.
The Park Terrace applicant maintained, upgraded and remodeled the
debtor’s rental units which led to the significant benefit to the estate.116 The In
re D’Lites applicant provided $500,000 in loans and staffed the failing business
with new employees.117 These applicants both contributed unquantifiable
benefits to the estate that should be considered when awarding administrative
expenses.118 If the Park Terrace townhomes lost money after the applicant
renovated them due to unrelated circumstances, he would not be able to point to
a “quantifiable” benefit to secure administrative expense priority.119 Similarly,
D’Lites lost money under Walton Investments despite its efforts to turn the
business around.120 The substantial contribution analysis should include actions
taken by the applicant that positively impact the debtor’s estate, including but
not limited to generating additional assets. Allowing applicants to recover
reasonable expenses (as opposed to actual expenses) for clear indirect benefits
will reduce the chilling effect on participation and encourage meaningful
participation for all. Even if an applicant loses money because of their efforts,
allowing reasonable expenses for their good faith effort prevents a total loss.
c. “Tangible Benefit”
This language, along with the “actual-direct-and-demonstrable-benefit test,”
have manifested as more precise evolutions of the traditional “benefit-to-theestate test.”121 Both tests appear to be grounded in the Chandler Act,122 which
amended the bankruptcy code in the United States as it existed in 1938.123
Sections 64a(l), 242 and 243 of the Chandler Act served as the basis for § 503(b)
of the 1978 Code.124 As both tests are rooted in the original language that formed
§ 503 of the modern Code, their “differences are based almost exclusively on
the terms that courts select to define the type of benefit necessary to satisfy the
substantial contribution standard.”125 Following the common theme in this area

116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

See id.
In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. at 356.
See id.; Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d 1019.
See generally Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d 1019.
In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. 352, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989).
Cohen, supra note 7, at 650.
Id.
Id. at 655.
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 355 (1977).
Cohen, supra note 7, at 677 n.20.
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of the law, what separates the practical use of these tests is merely conflicting
judicial interpretation.
The phrase tangible benefit,126 like actual and demonstrable benefit, requires
a material benefit to be made to the estate.127 A requirement that a benefit be
material should not mandate that it be quantifiable. The tangible benefit
requirement is currently interpreted to mandate quantifiable benefits before a
substantial contribution is found,128 but this should be changed. There is no
statutory language that ties “tangible” with “quantifiable.” While some
precedent compares the two terms, they can easily be distinguished.129
This Comment argues that a benefit can be material without being
quantifiable in many circumstances. Reducing costs to the estate is a material
benefit but is not quantifiable under the current interpretation in many
jurisdictions. Improving the marketing outreach and consumer perception of a
brand can provide a major material benefit to a debtor, but putting a number on
these figures requires expensive guesswork. Rather than requiring a quantifiable
benefit, courts should instead allow for applicants to demonstrate how they have
benefited the estate and allow for reasonable compensation for their efforts.
Unlike the language described above, the following tests are not rooted in
legislative language or intent but judicial creations.130 Both tests “look to the
overall effect on the reorganization process due to the claimant’s actions” rather
than adhering to the language provided by Congress.131
d. The Preference That the Benefit “Foster-And-Enhance-Rather-ThanRetard-Or-Interrupt-The-Reorganization-Process”
The vague language of this phrase allows courts to interpret the substantial
contribution analysis as needed on a case-by-case basis. Relying on this
language grants courts the freedom to “employ notions of equity, fairness[,] and
judicial independence to interpret the text of [§] 503 and develop standards to
judge or justify questionable or controversial fee and expense awards or to
126
Stone, supra note 23, at 252 (citing In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 176 B.R. 815, 819 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1995); In re Jack Winter Apparel, Inc., 119 B.R. 629, 633 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1990)).
127
See Cohen, supra note 7, at 670.
128
In re New Power Co., 311 B.R. 118, 126 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004).
129
In re W.T. Grant Co., 119 B.R. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“The Second Circuit has recognized the
“lodestar” principle whereby a basic per hour rate is multiplied by a factor which takes into account both results
achieved and quality of services rendered.”).
130
See Cohen, supra note 7, at 650 (“The foster-and-enhance-rather-than-retard-or-interrupt-the-progressof-reorganization test and the but-for test seem to be judicial creations less rooted in legislative action.”).
131
Id. at 650 n.21.
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support a claim of fostering and enhancing the process of reorganization.”132
This vagueness “signifies a judicial reaction to the lack of congressional
guidance in the statutory language of [§] 503.”133
A more liberal approach to the role of judicial discretion gives courts the
ability to bend this test to allow applicants to recover benefits that do not fit
exactly within the confines of § 503.134 A more conservative view, however,
limits the court’s discretion to the “well-established construction of the
statute.”135 It would be easiest to make the proposed change of the language in
§ 503 to the liberal view, as it allows for the broadest level of discretion.
i. Case Analysis
This “foster and enhance” language was used by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in the frequently cited case, In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc.136
There, the Court cites to commonly used language that administrative expense
priority should be granted because “services which substantially contribute to a
case are those which foster and enhance, rather than retard or interrupt the
progress or reorganization.”137 The Court goes on to discuss when compensation
is denied, citing to the Bankruptcy Court in the Eastern District of New York:
“Compensation has been denied where the services rendered by the creditor or
shareholder were only ‘remotely related to the reorganization[.]’’’138 The
reasoning behind this is that, “a creditor’s attorney must ordinarily look to its
own client for payment, unless the creditor’s attorney rendered services on
behalf of the reorganization, not merely on behalf of his client’s interest, and
conferred a significant and demonstrable benefit to the debtor’s estate and the
creditors.”139 Whether services relate to the reorganization independent of
selfish interests is a fine indicator for whether administrative expense priority
should be granted. Additionally, this indicator has nothing to do with whether
the services are quantifiable.

132
Id. at 671 (citing to In re K-FAB, Inc., 118 Bankr. 240, 242 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (“[F]ee determination . . .
must be a consideration of the overall ‘fairness and reasonableness’” of the fee under all of the circumstances).
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. (citing Grundy Nat’l Bank v. Rife (In re Rife), 71 Bankr. 129, 131 (Bankr. W.D. Va.)).
136
In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting In re White Motor Credit
Corp., 50 B.R. 885, 892 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (internal quotations omitted).
137
Id.
138
In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d at 1253 (citing In re Gen. Oil Distrib., Inc., 51 B.R. 794, 806
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
139
In re Gen. Oil Distrib., Inc., 51 B.R. at 806 (emphasis removed).
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Like the analysis of the In re D’Lites and Park Terrace cases above, In re
Consolidated Bancshares, Inc. provides an opportunity to demonstrate how the
solution proposed by this Comment would be incorporated into a real set of
facts.140 As illustrated above, there are several issues with the applicant’s request
that serve as the basis for denial of the request.
First, the applicants were a group of attorneys seeking compensation for
services that were also completed by the court-appointed equity security holders’
committee.141 These services, performed after the appointment of the equity
security holders committee, were therefore duplicative in time and effort, a fact
that was fatal to their request for administrative expense priority.142
Second, the applicants were motivated by a personal interest, not for the
benefit of the chapter 11 estate.143 As discussed above, a showing that the
applicant was primarily motivated by personal interest rather than the benefit of
the estate is fatal to administrative expense priority.144
Third, the action that the applicants performed was meritless.145 As the state
lawsuit became property of the estate once the bankruptcy petition was filed,
“the lawsuit could have been dismissed for lack of a proper party plaintiff, i.e.,
the debtor, and therefore had little value to the bankruptcy estate.”146
This Comment does not propose to eliminate the issues in this case listed
above from serving as sufficient evidence to deny administrative expense
priority. Instead, focus on the fact that the court had three distinct rationales to
decide the case on and still chose to cite “Foster-and-Enhance-Rather-thanRetard-or-Interrupt-the-Reorganization-Process” language.147 Including this
language serves no purpose in this decision and should be viewed as dicta.
Instead, this has been cited numerous times for that exact language in other
administrative expense cases.148
140

In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d at 1253.
Id. at 1252.
142
See In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. 770, 780–81 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014); In re Energy Partners,
Ltd., 422 B.R. 68, 80 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009); In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113, 132–35 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2006).
143
In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d at 1252.
144
See generally In re Lister, 846 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Patch Graphics, 58 B.R. 743, 746
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986) (“When a creditor incurs expenses primarily to protect its own interests [rather than
the interests of the estate,] the creditor is not entitled to a priority . . . claim.”).
145
In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d at 1252.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
See generally Lebron v. Mechem Fin. Inc., 27 F.3d 937, 944 (3d Cir. 1994); Batiste v. Sun Kona Fin.
I, LLC, No. CV 15-00397 ACK-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4936 at *5 (D. Haw. Jan. 12, 2017).
141

HINDERLEIDER_7.15.20

2020]

7/16/2020 1:57 PM

THAWING THE FREEZE

457

This language was cited by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re
Cellular 101, Inc.149 There, the Court cited this language when determining if a
bankruptcy court had made an error by granting administrative expense priority
to an applicant that proposed the only reorganization plan that was put before
it.150 Assisting the successful implementation of a reorganization plan was
specifically laid out by Congress as a substantial contribution to the estate.151 As
the only plan submitted to the bankruptcy court was proposed by the applicants,
they were clearly instrumental in its success.
This test does not clarify the substantial contribution analysis for courts,
applicants, or debtors. It appears to be a statement devoid of meaning that is
added to justify whatever analysis a court has decided to conduct. For
jurisdictions using this language, judges have total freedom to interpret it as
allowing administrative expense priority to applicants that have made a
substantial contribution without being able to quantify it. The broad language of
this test should be used to allow for administrative expenses for applicants who
fostered and enhanced the reorganization process, regardless of whether their
contribution can be quantified.
e. “But-For”
This language is based in tort law and is rarely used by courts in an
administrative expense context. Regardless, some courts require a showing that,
but for the actions of the applicant, the efforts of the case would be substantially
diminished.152
This test demonstrates how widely the approaches of courts have varied and
“illustrates the lack of unity in the standards and creates a possibility of unjust
results because of the emphasis on different factors.”153 Regardless, a but-for
standard, if used by a court, should allow administrative expenses for applicants
who benefited the estate, even if that benefit cannot be quantified.

149
In re Cellular 101, Inc., 377 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Consolidated Bancshares,
Inc., 785 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir. 1986)).
150
Id.
151
See S. REP. NO. 95-598, at 66–67 (1978) (“The phrase ‘substantial contribution in a case’ . . . does not
require a contribution that leads to confirmation of a plan, for in many cases, it will be a substantial contribution
if the person involved uncovers facts that would lead to a denial of confirmation . . . .”).
152
Cohen, supra note 7, at 677 (internal quotations omitted).
153
Cohen, supra note 7, at 672.
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The Fifth Circuit uses a cost-benefit analysis developed from a wide range
of opinions dealing with substantial contributions.154 This analyzes substantial
contributions on a case by case basis and requires that courts “weigh the cost of
the claimed fees and expenses against the benefits conferred upon the estate
which flow directly from those actions.”155 Those benefits that are only
conferred upon a portion of the estate are diminished in weight by the analysis
and are less likely to receive expenses.156
F. The Phrase “Actual and Necessary” in Section 503(B)(3) Does Not
Require That the Benefit to the Estate Be Quantifiable
The analysis above focused on the requirement that an applicant
substantially contribute to the estate but there are other requirements that must
be met as well. While this Comment focuses primarily on § 503(b)(3)(D), all
requirements of § 503(b)(3) must be met before subsection (D) is considered.
Section 503(b)(3) of the Code requires that applicants prove their benefit to
the estate was actual and necessary.157 The language used by courts when
making this determination is discussed below.
1. The Four Main Ideas by Courts in “Actual and Necessary” Analysis Do
Not Require That the Benefit to the Estate Be Quantifiable
Each of the following factors preclude an applicant from receiving
administrative expense priority because they are fatal to a claim that the
contribution was actual and necessary.
First, the court weighs the cost of administrative expense repayment against
the benefit conferred by the applicant.158 A substantial contribution is more
likely to be found if the benefit conferred by the applicant exceeds the cost that
the applicant seeks to assess against the estate.159

154

See, e.g., In re Am. Plumbing & Mech., Inc., 327 B.R. 273, 281 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005).
In re DP Partners Ltd. P’ship, 106 F.3d 667, 673 (5th Cir. 1997).
156
Id.
157
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3) (2019).
158
See In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. 770, 780–81 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014); In re Energy Partners,
Ltd., 422 B.R. 68, 80 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009); In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113, 132–35 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2006).
159
See In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. at 780–81; In re Energy Partners, Ltd., 422 B.R. at 80; In re
Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. at 132–35.
155
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Second, the benefit is scrutinized to ensure it was not the result of duplicative
efforts, which would allow multiple applicants to get paid for the same result.160
Courts are reluctant to find that a contribution was necessary when the
applicant’s efforts were duplicative of efforts undertaken by statutory
fiduciaries.161 This requires judges to “scrutinize claimed expenses for waste and
duplication[,]”162 but allows freedom to make this determination however they
see fit.163
Third, it is usually fatal for a substantial contribution claim if the applicant
is found to have negatively impacted the estate through their efforts.164 A finding
that the applicant had a negative effect on the case is often fatal to an
administrative expense claim.165 This is a broad category and can include
detrimental actions such as making questionable objections to pleadings filed by
the debtor or engaging in some other improper conduct that caused the debtor to
incur costs or that delayed resolution of a case.
Fourth, administrative expenses are usually denied if the applicant’s
participation was primarily motivated to benefit themselves rather than the
estate.166 However, “[m]ost activities of an interested party that contribute to the
estate will also, of course, benefit that party to some degree, and the existence
of a self-interest cannot in and of itself preclude reimbursement.”167
Regardless of the applicant’s ability to quantify a benefit, administrative
expenses should not be granted if the applicant’s contributions have a negative
impact on the estate. While applicants can take a risk that may or may not work
out in favor of the estate, there must be an agreement between the parties before
this takes place. Allowing administrative expenses for an applicant that
unilaterally decides to gamble in the proceedings regardless of the outcome goes

160
See In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. at 780–81; In re Energy Partners, Ltd., 422 B.R. at 80; In re
Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. at 132–35.
161
See In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. at 780–81; In re Energy Partners, Ltd., 422 B.R. at 80; In re
Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. at 132–35.
162
In re DP Partners Ltd. P’ship, 106 F.3d 667, 673 (5th Cir. 1997).
163
Id. (citing In re Lister, 846 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1988)).
164
See In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. at 780–81.
165
See id.
166
In re Kior, Inc., 567 B.R. 451, 459 (D. Del. 2017) (citing Lebron v. Mechem Fin. Inc., 27 F.3d 937,
944 (3d Cir. 1994)).
167
Lebron v. Mechem Fin., 27 F.3d 937, 944 (3d Cir. 1994).
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against the purpose of § 503168 and will inevitably lead to “mushrooming”
expenses.169
This Comment does not propose to alter the requirement that a benefit be
actual and necessary to the estate. Instead, this analysis should be left alone and
treated as separate from the substantial contribution analysis discussed above.
When courts describe the analysis of the actual and necessary requirement
alongside the substantial contribution analysis, language from both can be
conflated. As discussed in the substantial contribution breakdown above, this
leads to confusion of courts, applicants, and debtors alike.
G. Benefits of the Solution Proposed by this Comment
The solution proposed by this Comment will further the competing goals of
bankruptcy and increase judicial efficiency without significant change or effort.
Both benefits are discussed below.
1. This Solution Furthers the Competing Goals of Bankruptcy
Section 503 of the Code is understood to apply to a narrow set of
circumstances because it must balance promoting meaningful participation with
keeping costs to the estate to a minimum.170 Both goals will be met if substantial
contributions include benefits to the estate that do not quantifiably increase its
assets. It is established that substantial contribution awards are uncommon, as
they are “reserved for those rare and extraordinary circumstances when the
creditor’s involvement truly enhances the administration of the estate.”171
The rarity of these expenses is indicative of how hard it is for an applicant
to show that they substantially contributed to a case. More applicants who meet
both goals of § 503 should be reimbursed for their efforts because everyone
benefits as a result. This would further the goal of § 503(b)(3)(D) “to encourage
activities that will benefit the estate as a whole[.]”172 When applicants benefit
the estate more than their expenses will cost, there is a net gain for the debtor.
Even if the value of the payment to the applicant is adjusted to account for the

168
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 355 (1977) (“Those who must wind up the affairs of a debtor’s estate
must be assured of payment, or else they will not participate in the liquidation or distribution of the estate.”)
(emphasis in original).
169
In re Am. Plumbing & Mech., Inc., 327 B.R. 273, 279 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005).
170
In re Kior, Inc., 567 B.R. at 459.
171
Id. (citing In re RS Legacy Corp., No. 15-10197, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 854, at *1, *3 (Bankr. D. Del.
Mar. 17, 2016).
172
Stone, supra note 23, at 234 (quoting Lebron v. Mechem Fin., Inc., 27 F.3d 937, 944 (3d Cir. 1994)).
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premium on liquid assets for a debtor, applicant contributions can outweigh
administrative expense costs.173 Failure to compensate applicants for their
efforts goes against the goals of § 503(b)(3)(D) and reduces the efficiency of
bankruptcy proceedings.174
a. Judicial Efficiency
Encouraging applicants to meaningfully participate in proceedings,
especially in circumstances where their participation will provide a benefit to
the estate, will create a more cooperative bankruptcy process and allow
bankruptcy judges to spend more time on the more complicated matters in a
case. Judges should be willing to allow the most qualified parties to participate
in proceedings, regardless of the party. If a creditor is the best candidate to
wrangle the various parties who will be voting on the reorganization plan, that
creditor should be allowed to do so with the assurance that reasonable costs will
be paid for its efforts.
b. By Addressing Problems Earlier in a Case, Applicants Save Precious
Time and Money
Congress intended for § 503 to promote meaningful creditor participation
while keeping costs of the estate to a minimum.175 This goal is only satisfied if
applicants—and the attorneys representing them—are provided with meaningful
incentives. Administrative expenses provide a significant benefit, but are rarely
granted.176 The risk that these expenses will not be recovered makes
participating in bankruptcy proceedings a difficult choice to make.177 A court
refusing to grant administrative expenses when a significant contribution is
made unjustly enriches the debtor.178
In situations where an applicant makes a substantial contribution to the
estate, an analogy can be drawn to a medical emergency.179 When a medical
professional assists an injured party in an emergency, there are two justifications

173

In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. 770, 782–84 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014).
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 186–87 (1977); see generally In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 103 B.R. 427, 429 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5262 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1991).
175
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 18687 (1977).
176
Stone, supra note 23, at 223.
177
Id. at 248 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 116 (AM LAW
INST., Proposed Final Draft, 1936)).
178
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 116 (AM. LAW INST.,
Proposed Final Draft, 1936)).
179
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 116 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft, 1936)).
174
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for why the party should compensate the professional for their services. First,
the injured party would—if able—undoubtedly agree to pay for the procedure.180
The second is that, in an emergency, delaying treatment would be harmful to the
party.181
A similar situation occurs when an applicant for administrative expenses
confers a substantial contribution on the estate by exposing a problem that would
cost the estate.182 When a problem is solved before it arises, it is difficult to
determine how much of a benefit the applicant conferred upon the estate.
Although no assets were put into the estate, the cost of addressing the problem
after it arose gets offset, benefitting the bottom line.
The debtor would almost certainly rather pay the applicant for its efforts than
allow the reorganization to fail. While some issues may be fixable but expensive,
others would cause the case to be dismissed or transferred to chapter 7.
Additionally, as bankruptcy cases move quickly, waiting for court approval
before acting may result in significant costs to creditors and the estate.
H. Alternative Solutions
Though bankruptcy courts have the discretion necessary to implement this
change through their broad § 105 authority,183 other solutions may achieve the
same result. Finding new ways to quantify benefits previously precluded
because they were nonquantifiable is one such solution. Implementing the
common fund doctrine is another alternative that would achieve the results
suggested by this Comment. Courts may also alter their definition of what
constitutes a tangible benefit and make these changes on a case-by-case basis.
Allowing applicants themselves to make this argument is a similar solution that
places the burden on litigants rather than the judiciary. Judicial interpretation
can be altered in several ways, including § 105184 discretion. Finally, a direct
change to § 503 by Congress would be the most direct way to implement the
change proposed by this Comment.

180
Id. at 248–49 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 116 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final
Draft, 1936)).
181
Id. at 249 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 116 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft,
1936)).
182
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 116 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft, 1936)).
183
See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2019).
184
See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2019).
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1. Implementing New Methods of Quantifying Benefits
While courts can easily alter what constitutes a quantifiable benefit, the same
result will occur when implementing new methods of quantification.
a. A Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Be Used to Quantify Some Benefits,
Especially Those That Save the Estate Money Rather Than Increasing
Its Assets
A cost-benefit analysis that considers nonquantifiable contributions to the
estate will allow all applicants who assist the estate to be rewarded for their
efforts while preventing unnecessary costs to the estate. Increasing the assets of
the bankruptcy estate is a well-established way to receive administrative
expenses. If an applicant can show their efforts saved substantially more assets
of the estate than their expenses suggest, they should be entitled to
administrative expenses.185 After all, “[a] penny saved is a penny earned.”186
A good faith component would also discourage poor behavior by applicants.
The In re Adelphia Communications Corp. court rewarded negative conduct
when it granted a bondholder group administrativse expenses for making
motions that, if granted, would have been disastrous for creditor recovery.187
Their efforts caused other groups to invest in the proceedings, leading to
increased assets for the bankruptcy estate.188 Although this contribution would
meet the proposed cost-benefit analysis, this kind of behavior should not be
encouraged by bankruptcy courts.
The Fifth189 and Ninth190 Circuit already use a cost-benefit analysis to
determine whether a substantial contribution has been made. Allowing
applicants to demonstrate that their efforts benefited the estate more than the
expenses they seek would not add a great deal to the judicial workload and would
greatly increase efficiency.

185
See In re Living Hope Se., LLC, 509 B.R. 649 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2014) where a bankruptcy trustee in
a chapter 7 case was entitled to administrative expense priority in a subsequent chapter 11 case because he made
a substantial contribution to preserve assets that belonged to the debtor’s bankruptcy estate when he persuaded
the court to appoint a chapter 11 trustee.
186
E. Nesbit, The Robber and the Burglar, PALL MALL MAG. 107 (1899).
187
In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 159 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
188
Id. at 160.
189
In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249, 1252 (5th Cir. 1986).
190
In re Cellular 101, Inc., 377 F.3d 1092, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 2004).
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b. The Common Fund Doctrine Can Be Used as an Alternative Method
and Rationale for Granting Recovery to Applicants
A solution similar to the cost-benefit analysis was discussed in Encouraging
Creditor Participation: Integrating the Allowance of Administrative Expenses
with the Common Fund Theory.191 The Supreme Court created the common fund
doctrine in Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Greenough.192 There,
attorneys who brought in additional funds for a class were allowed payment from
those assets.193 The Court reasoned that a trustee in this scenario would have
been granted expenses from the increased funds and that the attorney had
provided the same benefit.194
Implementing the common fund doctrine to the administrative expense
analysis would allow for any quantifiable increase in assets to be used to pay
applicants, but it can also be applied to nonquantifiable benefits. Once an
applicant has shown a substantial contribution to the estate, the applicant will
then need to prove that the benefit the estate received is greater than the expenses
it seeks. If these requirements are met, the expenses can be taken out of the
benefit that the estate received.
c. Classifying Nonquantifiable Benefits as Tangible and Acceptable for
Administrative Expenses Leaves Discretion to Judges While Still
Implementing This Change
Another solution would be to classify these indirect benefits as quantifiable
and allow the judicial branch to sort out which benefits qualify. This shifts the
burden to the court and may require some additional time and effort to be
invested, but the resulting increase in judicial efficiency across the board will
negate the impact of making these determinations.
If codified into a statute, the language may look like this:
(1) In a proceeding where at least one interested party may not recover
the full value of its claim, an applicant will be presumed to have made
a tangible benefit to the estate if:

191
192
193
194

Stone, supra note 23, at 223.
Trs. of the Int’l Improvement Fund v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
Stone, supra note 23, at 238 (citing Trs. of the Int’l Improvement Fund, 105 U.S. 527).
Id. at 238–39 (citing Trs. of the Int’l Improvement Fund, 105 U.S. at 532).
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(A) The applicant benefited the estate in a manner that cannot be
quantified but nonetheless conferred a benefit that is greater than
the expenses they seek.

d. Placing the Burden of Showing that a Benefit Is Worthy of
Administrative Expenses on the Applicant Would Require Making
Room for Them to Make This Argument
This change would need carve out room for an applicant to demonstrate that
their benefit indirectly made a quantifiable contribution to the estate. Currently,
this argument is falling upon deaf ears in all circuits and statutory language
would be a powerful way to address it.195 The effort required would fall upon
both the applicant to prepare this argument and the courts to make the
determination, but the resulting increase in efficiency is worth it. A showing that
an applicant contributed to the estate in a way that is not quantifiable but
nevertheless made a tangible benefit would create a presumption of a substantial
contribution.
The language may look like this:
(1) In a proceeding where at least one interested party may not recover
the full value of its claim, an applicant will be presumed to have made
a tangible benefit to the estate if:
(A) The Applicant can affirmatively show that they benefited the
estate in a manner that cannot be quantified but nonetheless
substantially contributed to the estate.

It is important that this language is drafted carefully. Administrative
expenses must retain their narrow scope and must not be granted in many
situations. This language is not designed to be a loophole, but a narrow exception
that allows for applicants, that truly benefited the estate, to recover their costs.
Unfortunately, amending the Code may not be the top priority for legislators and
so the judicial branch will have to continue using its discretion to implement the
best methods.

195

Id. at 223.

HINDERLEIDER_7.15.20

466

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

7/16/2020 1:57 PM

[Vol. 36

e. Changing the Judicial Interpretation of the Section 503(B)(3)(D)
Analysis Is a Simple and Easy Change That Will Result in the Benefits
Listed Above
This Comment serves as a direct call to the federal judiciary to change the
interpretation of the current substantial contribution analysis. Below are
potential means for how this could be achieved using the court’s § 105 power.196
f. Judges Do Not Have to Conduct a Different Substantial Contribution
to Change the Interpretation of Section 503(B)(3)(D) as Proposed
Although administrative expenses are rarely granted to applicants and are
almost never granted to applicants who cannot demonstrate a quantifiable
benefit to the estate, the language of the statute nor the test itself are causing
these rejections. The requests of applicants are simply falling upon deaf ears.197
Judges are refusing to grant recovery when there is no quantifiable benefit
because they interpret that as failing the tangible benefit requirement. Not only
is this requirement judge-made law that could easily be changed, the requirement
itself does not imply that a quantifiable benefit must be shown.
Judges across the country could easily change their interpretation without
causing any major problems in bankruptcy proceedings. All other requirements
that make administrative expenses rare will remain in effect, but those who
deserve recovery would have more of an opportunity.
g. Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code Allows a Judge the Authority to
Implement This Change in Interpretation
Judges have the authority to invoke § 105 power to “issue any order, process,
or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out [the Code’s]
provisions.”198 This section serves to allow judges flexibility to carry out the
provisions of the Code, subject to some limitations. Section 105 can only be
invoked when necessary to “preserve an identifiable right conferred elsewhere
in [the Code.]”199 Additionally, a bankruptcy judge may not use § 105 to
“contravene specific statutory provisions.”200
196
See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2019) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”).
197
Stone, supra note 23, at 223.
198
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2019).
199
In re Jamo, 283 F.3d 392, 403 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S.
197, 206, (1988); In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc’y, Inc., 124 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1997)).
200
Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014).
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Section 105 authority can be used to interpret the substantial contribution
requirement as allowing nonquantifiable benefits so long as there is an
identifiable right201 and the action does not contravene any specific statutory
authority.202
There is an identifiable right in recovery for applicants who have conferred
a substantial contribution to the estate under § 503(b)(3)(D). There is no
statutory authority stating substantial contributions must be quantifiable for
recovery.
h. Amending the Language of Section 503(B)(3)(D) Is the Most Direct
Method of Implementing the Proposed Change
As § 503(b)(3)(D) is written ambiguously, there is room for Congress to
clarify when administrative expenses should be granted. Implementing a change
that furthers both of the twin aims of bankruptcy recognized should receive
bipartisan support.
i. Prescribing Specific Benefits That Qualify Ensures Certainty to
Applicants and Requires No Extra Effort From Judges
Implementing a change in the text of § 503(b)(3)(D) that leaves the core of
the language intact while adding a provision that lays out specific benefits that
qualify as administrative is one possible solution. This change would make
applicants aware of which efforts are worth pursuing and which would not result
in administrative expenses and require no interpretation from any party to
enforce.
This language may look like this:
(1) In a proceeding where at least one interested party may not recover
the full value of its claim, an applicant will be presumed to have made
a tangible benefit to the estate if,
(A) The applicant benefited the estate by
a. reducing costs to the estate,
b. shortening the time of the proceedings,
c. maximizing the value of assets,
d. proposing a reorganization plan,
e. (etc.)

201
In re Jamo, 283 F.3d at 403 (citing Norwest Bank Worthington, 485 U.S. at 206; In re Ludlow Hosp.
Soc’y, Inc., 124 F.3d at 27).
202
Law, 571 U.S. at 421.
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Congress can also use the language from § 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
that entitles a debtor to reasonable compensation for actual and necessary
services. Section 330(a) provides:
. . . the court may award to a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional person
employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title, or to the debtor’s attorney—
(1) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered
by such trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney, as the case
may be, and by any paraprofessional persons employed by such
trustee, professional person, or attorney, as the case may be, based on
the time, the nature, the extent, and the value of such services and the
cost of comparable services other than in a case under this title; and
(2) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.

As written, this language is too broad to be implemented for applicants
besides debtors, but it can provide a model for what the updated language should
look like.
The language could be tightened up to provide applicants more room to show
a substantial contribution without allowing them the same means as a debtor.
. . . the court may award to a creditor, an indenture trustee, an equity
security holder, or a committee representing creditors or equity
security holders—
(1) reasonable compensation for a substantial contribution conferred
upon the estate, based on the time, the nature, the extent, and the value
of such services and the cost of comparable services other than in a
case under this title; and
(2) reimbursement equal to the value added to the estate.

CONCLUSION
The changes required to allow applicants to recover for nonquantifiable
benefits under § 503(b)(3)(D) are easy to implement and worth the effort.
Applicants should be given a reasonable opportunity to participate in bankruptcy
proceedings to which they have an interest without fearing that they will be
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throwing money away without hope of reimbursement. It is the hope of this
Comment that reasonable change will be made to thaw the chilling effect of the
§ 503 administrative expense analysis.
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